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Do undocumented migrants underreport crimes to the police in order to avoid being
deported? And do criminals exploit such vulnerability? We address these questions
using victimization surveys and administrative data around the 1986U.S. immigration
amnesty. The amnesty allows us to solve two major identification issues that have
plagued this literature:migrants’ legal status is endogenous and unobserved. The results
show that the reporting rate of undocumented immigrants is 17 percent, which limits
the immigrants’ ability to protect some of their fundamental human rights. However,
right after the 1986 amnesty, which disproportionately legalized individuals of Hispanic
origin, crime victims of Hispanic origin show enormous improvements in reporting
behavior. The implied increase in the reporting rate by amnesty applicants is close to 20
percentage points. C© 2020 The Authors. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Association for Public Policy and
Management
INTRODUCTION
In recent years the estimated number of unauthorized immigrants living in the
United States is estimated to have flattened at around 11 million (representing
3.5 percent of the entire population), up from about 3.5 million in 1990.1 One of the
most controversial issues in the United States and in several Western countries is
how to deal with undocumented immigrants. The main policy options are usually
amnesties, though these tend to polarize the electorate. Public opinion polls show
that many citizens fear that undocumented immigration might not just bring job
losses and rising welfare costs but also high rates of crime.2
Because of such anti-immigration sentiments, a comprehensive immigration re-
form has eluded the U.S. Congress, and in 2016 a perfectly divided U.S. Supreme
Court blocked former President Obama’s Immigration Plan thatwould have shielded
up to half of the undocumented immigrant population from deportation, allowing
them to work in the United States. European institutions, subject to similar po-
litical pressure, cannot agree on a common immigration policy. Anti-immigration
1 See Krogstad et al. (2019) and Warren and Warren (2013).
2 See, for instance, http://www.pollingreport.com/immigration.htm.
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sentiments have fueled the BREXIT vote in the UK referendum, and more anti-
immigration acts may follow in other European countries.
A thorough evaluation of the various consequences of unauthorized migra-
tion represents the most likely solution to such gridlock. There is growing evi-
dence of the positive consequences of immigration amnesties. Economists have
shown that amnesties allow undocumented immigrants to access segments of the
labor market granting enhanced employment protection, better working condi-
tions, higher salaries, and the possibility of benefitting from better health-care
(Barcellos, 2010; Kossoudji & Cobb-Clark, 2002; Lozano & Sorensen, 2011).
And, as pointed out by the Washington Post (Badger, November 26, 2014), ac-
quiring legal status might influence many more outcomes. Immigrants who ben-
efit from an amnesty might invest more in education, in community institu-
tions, as well as in political participation. They may become more likely to
learn the host country language, and their children might become more likely
to go to college. Alsan and Yang (2018) show that immigrants who fear depor-
tation reduce the take-up of safety net programs, while Wang (2019) shows that
with an increased risk of deportation immigrants become more likely to enter
self-employment.
This study contributes to debate on illegal immigration and on amnesties
providing evidence on an important negative consequence of illegally residing
in the country: Undocumented immigrants are unable to protect their prop-
erty and their human right to security. Arguably out of fear of deportation,
undocumented immigrants who become crime victims are shown to under-
report such crimes to the police, generating an essentially unenforced space
for ruthless criminals. Amnesties might thus not only improve the labor mar-
ket opportunities of immigrants, thus lowering their criminal propensity, they
are shown to increase reporting rates and alter the expected cost of criminal
behavior.
The evidence on the reporting behavior of undocumented immigrants is still
scarce, as it either relies on correlational studies that do not measure legal sta-
tus or on studies that do measure legal status but only for small convenience
samples. In search of such evidence, we use the National Crime Victimization
Survey (NCVS) around the 1986 immigration amnesty (the Immigration Reform
and Control Act [IRCA]) to deal with the endogeneity of legal status as well as
with its measurement issue. We develop a simple empirical strategy to circum-
vent the main issue when dealing with undocumented migrants: In most household
surveys, respondents are not asked about their legal status; this is also the case
for the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). But administrative records
of IRCA applicants show that most of the undocumented immigrants were of
Hispanic origin. This implies that we can use Hispanic ethnicity as a proxy for
legal status. Since such proxy has known probabilities of misclassifying legal sta-
tus, we can adapt Aigner’s (1973) regression with a binary independent variable
subject to errors of observation to our difference-in-differences setup, which is
centered around the 1986 U.S. immigration amnesty. The amnesty granted legal
status to about 2.7 million undocumented immigrants (out of three million who
applied).
Using this adjusted proxymethod, we show that amnesties change the immigrants’
incentives to report a crime. Following the IRCA amnesty, as the risk of deportation
ceased to exist for IRCA applicants, the reporting rates of IRCA applicants went
from 17 percent to 37 percent, approaching the 39 percent reporting rates of non-
Hispanics, who are almost exclusively legal citizens.
Since police investigations are unlikely to start without a formal report of the
offence, amnesties are also likely to increase the conviction rate of criminals whose
victim is a newly legalized individual, therefore changing the relative benefits of
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victimizing immigrants versus natives.Whenever ethnicity or other observable char-
acteristics signal the legal status of immigrants, criminals may choose their targets
based on such signals. We study an ethnicity-based targeting strategy by criminals in
a formal model developed in Appendix A and briefly discussed in the next section.3
The comparative statics of this analysis highlight the identification strategy for this
amnesty-induced displacement of victimization. Specifically, the model predicts
amnesties to reduce the victimization of immigrants, and more so in places where a
large fraction of them become legalized, delivering a clear difference-in-differences
strategy. There is some evidence of these predictions in the data.
This implies not only that undocumented immigrants are unable to protect some
of their fundamental human rights, but also that the absence of this fundamental
human right makes them even more vulnerable. It also means that the deterrent
effect of law enforcement might be severely damped by the mere existence of such
victims.
Our results on the underreporting of crime has implications for the current po-
litical debate. Recently, President Trump’s administration has made attempts to
increase detection and deportation of undocumented immigrants (the so-called Se-
cure Communities program) by involving local authorities in the enforcement of
federal immigration law (287(g) program). This is likely to lead to additional under-
reporting. One potential solution would be to limit the collaboration between local
and federal authorities, when immigrants’ human right to security is involved.
Some local authorities have indeed set up Sanctuary policies, which, in order to
limit the fear of deportation and possible family break-up, attempt to limit the role
of local officials in immigration enforcement.
Our analysis has an additional implication that is worthmentioning. Investigating
the consequences of amnesties by looking at reported crimes may be misleading,
as an increase in reporting may be misinterpreted as an increase in crime. This
happens for two reasons: i) legalized immigrants report more, and ii) criminals
shift their targets from immigrants to natives, who are more likely to report.
RELATED LITERATURE
The evidence on the reporting behavior of undocumented immigrants is still scarce,
as it either relies on correlational studies that do not measure legal status or on
studies that do measure legal status but only for small convenience samples. Our
findings are consistent with those obtained in a few small-scale sample studies that
document the low propensity of undocumented immigrants to report crimes to the
police. Based on interviews in Memphis, Tennessee, Bucher et al. (2010) find that
these individuals experience a high rate of victimization and yet are reluctant to
report crimes to the police, mainly because of the perceived risk of deportation.
That fear of deportation may induce underreporting amongst Latino immigrants
has also beenmentioned in a study about immigrants in Phoenix, Arizona (Menjivar
& Bejarano, 2004), and in one about immigrants in Reno, Nevada (Correia, 2010).4
The only study that also uses a large and representative sample (theNCVS), finds that
crime reporting rates are negatively correlated with the relative size of noncitizen
and foreign-born individuals living in a metropolitan area (Gutierrez & Kirk, 2015),
but does not exploit any exogenous variation in legal status.
3 That higher reporting rates might reduce the incentives to commit a crime has been discussed in more
general terms in a theoretical paper (Garoupa, 2003) and in two more empirical ones (Goldberg & Nold,
1980; Goudriaan et al., 2006).
4 See also Barrick (2014).
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In spirit, our study is also closely related to recent research on the determinants of
crime reporting by women and victimization against them. Miller and Segal (2019)
use the NCVS to show that the integration of women in U.S. police departments
increased the reporting behavior of women who were victims of violent crimes, es-
pecially domestic violence. Consistent with our finding, they find that the increased
reporting behavior leads to subsequent reductions in crime.
Several contributions in the literature focus on the effect of immigration on
crime.5 The results are rather mixed, although most recent studies find little ev-
idence that immigration spurs crime (see, among others, Bianchi et al., 2012; Bell
et al., 2013).6 A couple of recent articles focus on amnesties and employ IRCA data
to study their effect on crime (see Baker, 2015; Freedman et al., 2013). The authors
show that documented immigrants have a lower propensity to be involved in crim-
inal activities than undocumented ones and interpret this finding using a standard
opportunity cost argument. There is also evidence fromother countries showing that
granting legal status changes the criminal involvement of immigrants. Mastrobuoni
and Pinotti (2015) exploit exogenous variation in legal status following the January
2007 European Union enlargement, while Pinotti (2017) employs Italian data on le-
galization lotteries. Pinotti (2015) also provides evidence that stricter enforcement
of migration policy reduces the crime rate of undocumented immigrants.
A MODEL OF CRIME AND REPORTING: AN INFORMAL PRESENTATION
In this section, we offer an intuitive discussion of the theoretical model presented
in the Appendix. In the model, we consider a city composed of two ethnic groups:
natives and immigrants. Some immigrants are legal citizens while others are undoc-
umented. Individuals differ also in terms of their wealth: All immigrants are poor,
while natives can be rich or poor.7
We study the following decisions. Each citizen chooses whether to be honest or to
commit crimes. Individuals who decide to become criminals observe the ethnicity—
native or immigrant—of the potential victims and choose which ethnic group to
target.8 Honest individuals who are victimized decide whether to report the crime
to the police. In our analysis, we first analyze the reporting decision of a victim.
The propensity for victims to report a crime increases with the economic loss they
suffer (which is proportional to their wealth) and it also depends on their legal
status (legal or undocumented). Undocumented immigrants who are poor and who
fear they could be deported if they contact the police have the smallest propensity
to report crime. By contrast, rich natives have the largest propensity to contact the
police and report crime. It follows that the average reporting rate is higher in the
group of natives than in that of immigrants.
The decision of whether to be honest or criminal is based on a comparison of
the utility enjoyed in the two cases. The utility of honest individuals increases
5 The consequences of immigration for labor market outcomes is also a topic that is intensively investi-
gated in the literature. See Borjas (1994) and Card (1990) among others.
6 Also, Butcher and Piehl (1998) and Piehl (2007) find no evidence that immigration overall increases
crime or incarceration rates.
7 This assumption is in line with what we observe in our dataset. Income differences between His-
panics and non-Hispanics are shown to be large in the National Crime and Victimization Survey (see
Appendix Figure A2). Household incomes are only available in broad intervals, but in relative terms
non-Hispanics versus Hispanic income differences are at least equal to 25 percent.
8 We assume that criminals cannot observe the wealth or the legal status of potential victims; but they
do observe an informative signal, their ethnic group—ethnicity may be an observable characteristic due
to different physical appearance or urban segregation by ethnicity. The U.S. is a clear example of where
ethnicity, particularly being of Hispanic origin, carries some signal for the migration status.
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with their wealth and their propensity to report crimes to the police. This lat-
ter assumption rests on the observation that the probability that a victim of a
crime receives a monetary compensation, for instance by means of the (partial)
return of the stolen goods or an insurance compensation, increases with the report-
ing rate: A higher reporting rate increases the capacity to protect one’s property
rights.
The utility of criminals depends on their ability to commit crimes. From this
assumption, it follows that only those who are skilled enough to commit offences
actually choose to become criminals. The decision ofwhich ethnic group to target de-
pends on a trade-off between a larger gain when targeting natives—natives are richer
on average—with a smaller expected punishment when targeting immigrants—the
average reporting rate is lower among immigrants. It follows that criminals with
higher criminal abilities prefer to target natives while those with a lower criminal
ability commit offences primarily against immigrants.
In the Appendix, we characterize the equilibrium choices of individuals. We then
study how these decisions change in the case of an amnesty that legalizes a frac-
tion of undocumented immigrants. The direct consequence of an amnesty is that
legalized individuals do not fear the risk of deportation anymore and, therefore, in-
crease their reporting rate. This fact has two effects. First, legalized immigrants are
better able to protect their property rights, and therefore the utility of honesty in-
creases for them—their opportunity cost of becoming criminals gets larger. Second,
the average reporting rate of the immigrant group increases, and such an increase
is stronger the larger the number of legalized immigrants. The predictions of the
model regarding the consequences of amnesties are the following:
Predictions of the Model
1. Amnesties increase the reporting rate of undocumented migrants, while they
do not change those of legal immigrants and natives.
2. Amnesties reduce the overall number of crimes.
3. Amnesties reduce the number of crimes committed against immigrants while
they can either increase or decrease those committed against natives.
4. The reduction in the overall number of crimes and in the number of crimes
committed against immigrants is larger the larger the fraction of legalized
immigrants.
The increased opportunity cost of becoming criminal for legalized immigrants
and the deterrent effect on crime of the higher average reporting rate of the im-
migrant group reduce the number of individuals who choose to become crimi-
nals. This fact implies that crime reduces. In addition to that, the higher report-
ing rate of immigrants also changes the distribution of crime, inducing some
criminals to shift from the immigrant to the native target. These two effects,
overall reduction in criminality and shift in targeting, are stronger the larger
the share of legalized immigrants and they both reduce the number of crimes
committed against the immigrants. By contrast, the effect of an amnesty on the
number of crimes committed against natives is, in general, ambiguous. On one
side, some criminals shift from targeting immigrants to targeting natives; on the
other side, natives benefit from the spillovers related to the overall reduction in
criminality.
Discussion of the Modeling Assumptions
Our model is based on some important assumptions that are worth discussing be-
fore moving to the empirical analysis. We assume that the only effect of an amnesty
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is to reduce the risk of deportation. In principle, however, amnesties may also in-
crease immigrants’ labormarket prospects. Thismay lower the incentives to become
criminals and increase the likelihood to become victims of crime. Nevertheless, two
considerations are in order. The first effect would increase the opportunity cost
of crime, thus reinforcing our findings. As for the second effect, as long as the
effect of the greater propensity to report is stronger than the effect related to the
increase in actual wealth, we would still see that an amnesty reduces the incentives
to commit crimes against immigrants. Moreover, the increase in wealth would not
be immediate, while our empirical analysis is going to focus on the short-run effect
of legalization.
Another important assumption of the model is that undocumented immigrants
can benefit from an amnesty irrespective of their skill at criminal activity. Gov-
ernments, however, may choose to grant legalization only to individuals without a
criminal history. This would potentially introduce a negative correlation between
legalization and criminal activity. If this were the case, then the effect of amnesties
on crime would be dampened by the fact that only honest immigrants would benefit
from the amnesty. However, the deterrence effect of an increasing reporting rate
would still generate a crime reduction.
Finally, it is worth noting that some of the predictions of the model are consistent
with an alternative way of modeling criminals’ behavior. Evidence suggests that
offenders often target individuals who belong to their own ethnicity or race (see,
for instance, Morgan, 2017). If this is the case, then an amnesty would mostly affect
immigrants’ victimization. But because of spillover effects, the effect on natives
would still be ambiguous. Only in the limiting case of perfectly separated ethnicities
would an amnesty entail no effect on the number of crimes committed against
natives.
THE IRCA, DATA, AND MEASUREMENT STRATEGIES
This section describes the IRCA andmain data sources used in the empirical section.
The IRCA
The U.S. Senate introduced the IRCA bill in May 1985 and President Ronald Rea-
gan signed the bill in June 1986.9 In order to be eligible, unauthorized immigrants
had to be in continuous residence since January 1, 1982 (for a total of five years).
Temporary residency lasted 18 months, after which the legalized immigrants be-
came eligible for permanent residency (i.e., green cards). Approximately 1.75 mil-
lion people applied for legalization through the program and about 94 percent of
applications were approved for temporary residency (on average in about seven
months). Alternatively, in more rural places, the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW)
program provided permanent residency to undocumented immigrants who could
demonstrate they had 60 days of seasonal agricultural work experience in qualifying
crops from May 1985 to May 1986. Nearly 1.3 million people applied for the SAW
program. We are going to use both types of applicants: in our sample applicants are
split approximately 50/50 across the two programs. About 2.7 million applicants, or
about 90 percent, were ultimately approved for permanent residence (Rytina, 2002).
The administrative records of the 1986 amnesty, called IRCA’s Legalization Sum-
mary Public Use Tape, contains information about all applicants. County of resi-
dence is supplied only when the county had at least 100,000 residents in the 1990
9 See Appendix Figure A3 for a full timing of all the amnesty proposals.
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Census, and at least 25 legalization applicants. Since we focus on large Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (MSAs) that are part of the NCVS-MSA victimization sur-
vey, this is not a constraint. The other information we use is age and race of the
applicants (there are five categories: Asian; Black, non-Hispanic; Hispanic; White,
non-Hispanic; Unknown).10
The IRCA records give us the exact number of applicants for Hispanic and non-
Hispanic adults. Next, to measure the fraction of applicants by Hispanic origin,
we need the corresponding population, which we get from the 1980 and 1990
Census.
CENSUS Data
The 1980 and 1990 decennial Censuses from the IPUMS allow us to estimate the
population of Hispanic and non-Hispanic individuals by MSA. While the IRCA
years do not coincide with a Census year, we interpolate the 1980 and 1990 Cen-
sus population to get an estimate of 1987 (the starting year of the amnesty). The
fraction of Hispanic and non-Hispanic applicants in each NCVS-MSA is shown in
Table 1.
Reporting and Victimization Data
The analysis of crime reporting behavior and victimization relies on victimization
surveys. We use the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), conducted by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) since 1973. Like most surveys, there is no
information on the legal status of immigrants; in fact, there is not even information
on migration or on the country of birth.11
But the NCVS-MSA version of the survey contains information on the 40 largest
MSAs and can be merged with geographic information about IRCA applicants. The
survey asks a nationally representative sample of individuals about crime incidents,
and whether these have been reported or not to police. Crimes include rapes, as-
saults, including sexual ones, robberies, purse snatching, burglaries, motor vehicle
thefts, and other thefts.
We focus on a symmetric time window from 1981 to 1994, around 1987 and 1988,
when the IRCA applications were granted (see the left panel of Figure 1). Post 1994
years are excluded because of the 1994 Immigration and Nationality Act (which
went into effect at the end of 1994), which introduced a temporary amnesty for
about half a million undocumented immigrants. We exclude from the NCVS data
American Indians (less than one percent of the sample), Asians (about 4 percent),
and individuals for whom no race is specified (about 7 percent).12 The right panel
of Figure 1 shows, based on Immigration and Naturalization Service (now called
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services [USCIS]) data, that the number of yearly
deportations fell immediately after the IRCA, and started growing again in 1990,
which is something we are going to come back to shortly.
The NCVS contains information about Hispanic origin and about the age range
of respondents in five- or 10-year intervals, starting with age 12.13 We focus our
10 The administrative records also contain information about the country of origin, gender, wages,
occupation, marital status, date of entry in the U.S., date of application, and whether the application was
approved.
11 Without this information it is impossible to use a residual approach to predict whether a respondent
is an undocumented immigrant (see Borjas, 2017).
12 Adding these small groups does not alter the results.
13 Appendix Figure A4 plots the probability of IRCA application by Hispanic origin and age. In the next
two sections, we explain how we compute the probability.
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Table 1. Fraction of Hispanic population by MSA (undocumented and total).
Fraction of applicants in the IRCA
amnesty
MSA Non-Hispanics Hispanics
Atlanta, GA 0.17% 45.07%
Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA 0.23% 42.92%
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 0.22% 41.68%
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA 0.03% 40.38%
San Diego, CA 0.13% 33.32%
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 0.46% 33.19%
Houston, TX 0.23% 25.05%
Dallas, TX 0.12% 24.72%
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 2.17% 24.38%
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 0.16% 24.05%
Chicago, IL 0.16% 19.82%
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 0.31% 16.37%
San Jose, CA 0.16% 16.05%
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 0.10% 12.81%
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 0.04% 12.16%
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 0.10% 12.14%
Fort Lauderdale, FL 1.52% 12.00%
Orlando, FL 0.32% 11.94%
Average for MSAs with δ>10% 0.27% 28.80%
Sacramento, CA 0.06% 8.71%
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 0.04% 8.07%
Nassau-Suffolk, NY 0.16% 8.04%
Oakland, CA 0.10% 7.81%
San Francisco, CA 0.07% 7.15%
Miami, FL 3.78% 6.10%
Kansas City, MO-KS 0.02% 5.96%
Denver, CO 0.03% 5.66%
Boston, MA-NH 0.16% 4.77%
Newark, NJ 0.39% 4.58%
San Antonio, TX 0.09% 3.91%
New York, NY 0.70% 3.52%
Philadelphia, PA-NJ 0.04% 3.40%
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 0.03% 2.88%
Baltimore, MD 0.03% 1.95%
St. Louis, MO-IL 0.01% 1.81%
Detroit, MI 0.02% 1.77%
Columbus, OH 0.07% 1.46%
Cleveland, Lorain, Elyria, OH 0.02% 1.22%
Pittsburgh, PA 0.00% 0.49%
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 0.01% 0.47%
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA 0.01% 0.28%
Average for MSAs with δ<3% 0.02% 1.55%
Overall Average 0.25% 18.07%
Notes: The fraction of applicants is the ratio between IRCA’s total number of applicants and the corre-
sponding population based on the 1980 and 1990 Census, linearly interpolated to get the figure for 1987
(the onset of the amnesty). δ represents the fraction of Hispanics in the MSA.
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Notes: The number of NCVS-MSA IRCA applicants is based on authors’ calculation by matching the
Legalization Summary Public Use Tape with the NCVS survey. The number of deportations refers to the
entire U.S. and is based on the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services data.
Figure 1. IRCA Applicants and Deportations of Unauthorized Immigrants.
Table 2. Summary statistics.
Victims All
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Reported the crime 0.39 0.49 0 1
Crime victim 1.00 0.00 0.14 0.35 0 1
Hispanic 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.33 0 1
White 0.84 0.36 0.85 0.36 0 1
Female 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50 0 1
Age 25–29 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43 0 1
Age 29–34 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 0 1
Age 35–39 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.41 0 1
Income $7,500-$14,999 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.34 0 1
Income $15,000-$24,999 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0 1
Income $25,000-$29,999 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.28 0 1
Income $30,000-$49,999 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.41 0 1
Income $50,000 and over 0.11 0.32 0.14 0.35 0 1
Income missing 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.34 0 1
Year 1987 4 1987 4 1981 1994
Observations 73,248 518,596
Notes: Based on NCVS data matched with the 1980 Census.
analysis on respondents between the ages of 18 and 39, whose chance of applying
for the amnesty is more than twice as much as for younger and older respondents.
The 18- to 39-year-old respondents represent about 50 percent of the population but
more than 70 percent of the victims. Given the MSA-level stratified cluster sample
design of the NCVS data, we cluster the standard errors at the MSA level.14
Table 2 (Summary Statistics) shows that we have an overall sample of about half
a million respondents, about 15 percent of whom are victims of a crime.15
Of these, only 39 percent report the crime to the police. In Appendix Table A1, we
divide the summary statistic by whether in an MSA more or less than 10 percent
14 While we do not use sampling weights, this makes almost no difference.
15 For respondents who report being victimized several times, there is one observation for each incident.
This allows us to properly characterize the incident and to properly account for multiple victimizations.
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of the Hispanic population were amnesty applicants (see Table 1). Not surprisingly,
the main difference is in the fraction of Hispanic individuals and Hispanic victims.
The likelihood of victimization is also larger in MSAs when a larger fraction of
Hispanics applied for IRCA. All other variables appear to be well-balanced.
Measurement Strategies
We exploit two features about the 1986 IRCA amnesty to circumvent the issue
that immigration status and legal status are both unobserved in the victimization
surveys. The first is that Hispanics represent the grand majority of applicants and
can thus be used as their proxy. The left panel of Figure 1 shows that between 1987
and 1988 about 1.6 million Hispanics applied for legal status in theMSAs covered by
the NCVS. The number of non-Hispanic applicants is almost an order of magnitude
smaller. Given that Hispanics made up only about 10 percent of the total population,
the likelihood that someone of Hispanic origin was an IRCA applicant is about two
orders of magnitude larger than for non-Hispanics.
The MSA-NCVS version of the U.S. victimization survey can be linked with the
U.S. Census, which has information about Hispanic origin, allowing us to compute
the corresponding overall population. For the fraction of Hispanic (H = 1) and non-
Hispanic (H = 0) individuals who applied for the IRCA in a given MSA, we simply
take the ratio between the total number of IRCA applicants and the corresponding
total population from the CENSUS:
δMSA,H =
IRCA ApplicantsMSA,H
CENSUS PopulationMSA,H
(1)
Table 1 lists the fraction of applicants by Hispanic origin. In almost all MSAs
non-Hispanics have less than a one percent chance of applying for the amnesty.
Their overall chance of applying is 0.25 percent, while it is 18 percent for Hispanics.
These numbers imply that using Hispanic origin as proxy for IRCA applicants is
subject to misclassification, an issue we are going to tackle later on. The second
feature that we exploit is that the distribution of applicants across U.S. cities was
quite uneven.
Table 1 ranks cities based on the fraction of Hispanics who applied for the IRCA.
The MSAs where more than 10 percent of the Hispanic population were amnesty
applicants are, starting from the top, Atlanta, GA, Anaheim-Santa Ana, Riverside-
San Bernardino, Portland-Vancouver, San Diego, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Hous-
ton, Dallas, West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, Phoenix-Mesa, Chicago, Washington
(DC), San Jose, Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill,
Fort Worth-Arlington, Fort Lauderdale, and Orlando. For these cities the average
probability is almost one-third. For the bottom nine MSAs, all with Hispanic frac-
tions that are less than 3 percent, Columbus, Detroit, Cleveland, Lorain, Elyria (OH),
Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, and Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News the overall num-
ber is just 1.55 percent. The next section describes how we plan to exploit these
differences for identification.
REPORTING BEHAVIOR, VICTIMIZATION, AND LEGAL STATUS
Identification Strategy
We model two different behaviors, the victims’ reporting behavior as a function
of whether they are legal immigrants or not, and the criminals’ ethnic targeting
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behavior as a function of whether there is a large or small fraction of IRCA applicants
in the city, and we allow these behaviors to change with the IRCA.
Right before the IRCA, we know that at least three million undocumented immi-
grants, mostly of Hispanic origin, resided in the United States (the applicants) out
of about 18.5 million Hispanics, while after the IRCA an estimated flow of 800,000
undocumented immigrants would enter the country every year (Warren & Warren,
2013). We also know that by 1990, the estimated stock of undocumented immi-
grants had already reached 3.5 million (Warren & Warren, 2013). This implies that
the IRCA effect should be short-lived, as the stock of eligible migrants would quickly
mix with the new flow of ineligible migrants (Orrenius & Zavodny, 2003).16 This is
consistent with the observed resurgence of deportations following the end of the
amnesty (right panel of Figure 1).
The main identification assumption is that treated and control individuals would
have followed parallel trends in the absence of the amnesty.
Reporting Behavior
Our theoreticalmodel predicts that undocumented immigrants should increase their
reporting following the IRCA, while natives should not (Prediction 1). This leads to
an empirical strategy where we compare the indicator variable for reporting a crime
to the police (R = 0,1) depending on Hispanic (H = 1) and the non-Hispanic (H =
0) origin of the victim in the two IRCA amnesty years 1987 and 1988 (AY = 1), with
those before (1981 to 1986) and after (1989 to 1994) the amnesty (AY = 0):
Ri = β1Hi + β2Hi × AYi + β ′3Xi + i . (2)
The coefficient β2 measures the difference in reporting rates between Hispanics
and non-Hispanics in 1987 and 1988 compared to the years before and after the
amnesty. This empirical strategy is supposed to isolate the changes in reporting that
are driven by the amnesty (underreporting may be driven by many other factors, but
as long as these factors are not changing over time they are going to be differenced
out). The vector of regressors Xi contains year and MSA fixed effects, and in some
specifications, crime-type fixed effects, as well as MSA-specific time trends. Errors
can be correlated across individuals living in the same MSA in a given year.
Given that from the victims’ perspective, the aim is to estimate these difference-in-
differences conditional on being an IRCA applicant A as opposed to just a Hispanic
individual H, the estimates are subject to misclassification bias. On one side, not all
Hispanics were eligible and applied for the amnesty, P(A = 1|H = 1) = δ < 1, on the
other side, some non-Hispanics might also have applied, or P(A = 0|H = 0) = q < 1.
Since most eligible applicants are believed to have applied (which is unsurprising
given the incentives of becoming legalized), these errors stem from Hispanics who
entered the country after January 1, 1982 (they had been a resident for less than five
years at the time of the IRCA), as well as from those who were already U.S. citizens
by the time of the IRCA.
The misclassification probabilities 1 − δ and 1 − q are known to bias the results
(Aigner, 1973). Assuming that, conditional on the application status, Hispanic origin
has an additive effect α on reporting, we have that the application rates for Hispanics
and non-Hispanics are:
E(R|H = 1, t) = α + δEt(R|A = 1, t) + (1 − δ)E(R|A = 0, t)
16 These numbers imply that in 1986, the fraction of undocumented Hispanics was at least 3/18.5=16.2
percent. In 1990, the same fraction was 3.5/21=16.6 percent.
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E(R|H = 0, t) = qE(R|A = 0, t) + (1 − q)E(R|A = 1, t).
Taking first a difference between the two equations and, after rearranging, taking
a second difference across time (t), we get rid of α and obtain our difference-in-
difference:
t [E (R|A = 1) − E (R|A = 0)] = t [E (R|H = 1) − E (R|H = 0)]
δ + q − 1 , (3)
which is biased by the factor δ + q − 1. Similarly to Card and Krueger (1992),
we are going to first estimate the differences across Hispanic and non-Hispanic
respondents and later adjust the estimates based on MSA-level numbers for q and p.
In Table 1, the fraction of applicants for non-Hispanics is an estimate of 1 − q,
while for Hispanics it is an estimate of δ. Across all MSAs, the estimated q is larger
than 99.75 percent, while the estimated overall δ is 18 percent. Since the differences-
in-differences are downward biased by a factor equal to δ + q − 1, they have to be
inflated by a factor of 5.6. Focusing on MSAs with a very small fraction of Hispanic
applicants is also going to provide an interesting placebo group. With respect to the
parallel trends assumption, it is important to add that differences in policing would
be differenced out across individuals residing in the same MSA, unless the police
responded to the amnesty by changing their focus based on ethnicity (with victims
noticing such changes).
Victimization Behavior
According to our model, Hispanics are estimated to be victimized at lower rates
following the IRCA (Prediction 3), and the changes are predicted to be increasing
in the share δ of eligible immigrants in the MSA (Prediction 4).17 Victimization
rates against non-Hispanics might increase or decrease depending on the degree of
spillover in victimization across ethnicity. For this reason, the ideal difference-in-
differences strategy compares victimization rates of individuals of Hispanic origin
in places with large and small δs. We compare victimization rates in the top and
bottomMSAs based on δ, providing a full spectrum of robustness checks about how
we define such groups.
Unlike what happens for reporting, predictions are about differences based on
ethnicity rather than IRCA applicants, which implies that the estimates do not
need to be adjusted for misclassification. The difference-in-differences model in
victimization (V = 0,1) that is run separately for Hispanics and non-Hispanics is:
Vi = δ1TOP(δ)i × AYi + δ′2Xi + εi . (4)
The indicator variable TOP(δ)i indicates whether the individual resides in an MSA
where the number of Hispanic amnesty applicants was more than 10 percent of the
Hispanic population. The regressors Xi contain year and MSA fixed effects, and,
in some specifications, MSA-specific time trends. We allow errors to be correlated
across individuals living in the same MSA in a given year. Regarding the parallel
trends assumption, changes in policingwould not be differenced out aswe are taking
changes across different MSAs. For this reason, we allow for differential trends, but
cannot rule out that changes in policing may alter the results.
17 The amnesty should also reduce overall crime, though such a prediction is more difficult to test given
that several factors may influence overall crime.
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Figure 2. Unconditional Reporting Rates for Hispanics and Non-Hispanics.
Figure 3. Difference-in-Differences in Reporting Rates Between Hispanics and
Non-Hispanics in all MSAs with Base Year 1987.
RESULTS
Reporting Rates
The evolution of the difference-in-differences in reporting rates between Hispanics
and non-Hispanics using 1987 as a base year is shown in Figure 3 (the raw series
is shown in Figure 2).18 Reporting rates are usually lower for Hispanics than for
non-Hispanics, but not in the years of the amnesty.
Unconditional reporting rates for Hispanics and non-Hispanics differ by about
five percentage points. The only years where the reporting rates are quite close to
each other are 1987 and 1988. Then they start diverging again, in line with grow-
ing numbers of undocumented Hispanics who keep on entering the country. It is
18 The regression controls for year and MSA fixed effects.
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Notes: The sample is made of MSAs where less than 3 percent of Hispanics applied for the IRCA. The
base year is 1987.
Figure 4. Placebo Difference-in-Differences in Reporting Rates Between Hispanics
and Non-Hispanics.
Table 3. Reporting regressions.
All MSAs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amnesty years × Hispanic 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.036** 0.036**
(0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014)
Hispanic −0.055*** −0.038*** −0.048*** −0.047***
(0.013) (0.00) (0.008) (0.008)
Year fixed effects
√ √ √ √
MSA fixed effects
√ √ √
Socioeconomic characteristics
√ √ √
Crime-type fixed effects
√ √
MSA-specific time trends
√
Observations 73,248 73,248 73,248 73,248
R-squared 0.002 0.009 0.108 0.109
Mean dep. var 0.385 0.385 0.385 0.385
Notes: The socioeconomic variables include age group dummies, gender, number of householdmembers,
and dummies for household income categories. Clustered standard errors (by MSA) are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
comforting to notice that the figure shows no pre-trends in the difference between
Hispanics and non-Hispanics, which is a necessary condition for the appropriate-
ness of the difference-in-differences strategy.
As a placebo exercise, Figure 4 focuses on communities where the fraction of
IRCA applicants is less than 3 percent. The estimates are necessarily noisier, given
the small sample of Hispanics, but no differences emerge during the Amnesty years.
Whether all these differences are statistically significant and robust when con-
trolling for potential confounders is evidenced in Table 3. We estimate equation (2)
using a linear probability model. The first column controls only for year fixed ef-
fects, capturing changes in reporting behavior that are shared by Hispanics and
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Table 4. Placebo regressions: Reporting in MSAs in which less than 3 percent of the Hispanic
population were amnesty applicants.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MSAs with less than 3% of Hispanic Applicants.
Amnesty years × Hispanic 0.050 0.048 0.026 0.021
(0.048) (0.054) (0.046) (0.045)
Hispanic −0.041 −0.034 −0.042 −0.038
(0.026) (0.021) (0.025) (0.024)
Year fixed effects
√ √ √ √
MSA fixed effects
√ √ √
Socioeconomic characteristics
√ √ √
Crime-type fixed effects
√ √√√
MSA-specific time trends
√
Observations 14,213 14,213 14,213 14,213
R-squared 0.004 0.012 0.107 0.109
Mean dep. var 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.395
Notes: This Table mimics Table 3. Clustered standard errors (by MSA) are in parentheses. *** p<0.01;
** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
Table 5. Reporting regressions by crime types.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crime type Violent Economic Robbery Burglary Theft Assault
Amnesty years × Hispanic 0.027 0.042** −0.005 0.031 0.043** 0.038
(0.050) (0.016) (0.086) (0.048) (0.020) (0.065)
Hispanic −0.011 −0.039*** −0.112*** −0.028 −0.044*** 0.027
(0.019) (0.008) (0.036) (0.023) (0.008) (0.020)
Observations 12,844 61,352 2,765 10,896 47,691 9,723
R-squared 0.026 0.011 0.076 0.038 0.011 0.026
Mean dep. var 0.521 0.365 0.557 0.523 0.318 0.512
Notes: All regressions are restricted to MSAs with many undocumented immigrants of Hispanic origin.
All regressions include MSA and year fixed effects, as well as age group dummies, gender, number of
householdmembers, and dummies for household income categories. Clustered standard errors (byMSA)
are in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
non-Hispanics alike. Hispanic reporting rates are estimated to go up by 5.1 percent-
age points in the two years of the amnesty. Adding MSA fixed effects and controlling
for socioeconomic characteristics lowers the effect only slightly.
In column 3, we add crime-type fixed effects that might be correlated with the
legal status of the respondents (as well as with the reporting behavior). When doing
so, the difference-in-differences estimate is equal to 3.6 percentage points and is
still significant at the one percent level. To make sure that the results are not driven
by pre-existing differential trends, in the last column we add MSA-specific time
trends, and the results are basically unchanged. Replicating the previous analysis
for individuals in MSAs in which the number of Hispanic amnesty applicants was
less than 3 percent of the Hispanic population, shows that the estimated difference-
in-differences end up being very close to zero (see Table 4).
Table 5 shows that the results are more precisely estimated for economic crimes,
especially thefts. Most differences by types of crime are positive, though statistical
power is an issue, particularly for the less prevalent violent crimes.
Given the misclassification, the effects have to be inflated by a factor of 5.5,
meaning that based on the last column of Table 3, applicants’ chance of reporting
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Notes: In top MSAs at least 10 percent of Hispanics applied for the IRCA, in bottom ones less than 3
percent did. The base year is 1987.
Figure 5. Difference-in-Differences in Victimization Rates of Hispanics (left) and
Non-Hispanics (right) in Top and Bottom MSAs.
goes up by 0.036 × 5.5, or 20 percentage points. What does this imply for the level
of underreporting of undocumented immigrants?
In the non-amnesty years and in the amnesty years, the reporting rate of Hispanics
is a weighted average of documented (RD) and undocumented Hispanics(RU).
RH0 = γ RU + (1 − γ )RD
RH1 = (γ − δ)RU + (1 − (γ − δ ))RD
Taking the difference and solving for the unobserved RU
RU = RD − R
H
1 − RH0
δ
,
which, importantly, does not depend on the fraction of undocumented Hispanics γ
(as it is unobserved). But it does depend on the reporting rate of documented His-
panics. Taking the reporting rate in MSAs with almost no Hispanics as a benchmark
for RD, we get that RU = 0.36 − 0.20 = 0.16.
Could these results be compounded by changes in police behavior? Reporting
depends on victims’ cost/benefit calculations. For the observed changes in reporting
to be driven by police behavior, the victims would have to quickly realize that an
increased police effort is aimed at helping Hispanic victims. While police officers
may devote more effort to protecting legal citizens, it would probably be hard for
victims to observe such changes.
There is clear evidence that Hispanic victims are less likely to report crimes to
the police and that these effects narrow when amnesties are passed. Undocumented
victims’ reporting rate is less than half the size of documented ones. Whether these
differences trigger a criminal response is going to be our next research question.
Victimization Rates
The left panel of Figure 5 shows the difference in Hispanic victimization rates
between the top and the bottom MSAs in terms of δs. The effect is large, but Ap-
pendix Figure A5 shows that this result is driven by an increase in victimization
in the control MSAs, those with few Hispanic applicants, around the years of the
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Table 6. Victimization regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Has been victimized (0/1)
Amnesty years × −0.095* −0.096* −0.096* −0.006 −0.005 −0.005
Large fraction of Hisp. applicants (0.055) (0.054) (0.053) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
MSA fixed effects
√ √ √ √ √ √
Year fixed effects
√ √ √ √ √ √
Socioeconomic characteristics
√ √ √ √
MSA specific time trends
√ √
Observations 42,406 42,406 42,406 309,974 309,974 309,974
R-squared 0.005 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.023 0.024
Mean dep. var 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.148 0.148 0.148
Notes: The socioeconomic variables include age group dummies, gender, number of householdmembers,
and dummies for household income categories. Clustered standard errors (by MSA) are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
amnesty. This implies that the results are correct as long as that pattern would
have been the counterfactual victimization in the MSAs with many applicants in the
absence of the IRCA. Later we are going to see that the results are driven by the
bottom 10 MSAs in terms of share of applicants among the Hispanic population,
and that the effects are increasing as we reduce the number of control MSAs.
An additional issue is that the decrease in victimization appears to start in 1986,
one year ahead of the amnesty. This would be consistent with some anticipation ef-
fect, as criminals may fear a delayed reporting once it is known that an immigration
amnesty is going to take place.
There are no apparent changes in victimization for non-Hispanics. The ab-
sence of crime displacement against non-Hispanics is in line with the model’s
predictions with intermediate probability of targeting the wrong ethnic group (see
the Appendix).19
Estimating equation (4) using a linear probability model of victimization, we
find similar effects to the ones shown in the figures (see Table 6). Comparing the
victimization probabilities of Hispanics, depending on whether they live in MSAs
with a small or a large fraction of Hispanic IRCA applicants, both before, during, and
after the IRCA, we find evidence that during the IRCA years the victimization rates
drop by about 9.5 percentage points (−75 percent). The first three columns show
that the results are robust to various controls (age, gender, number of household
members, and income). Adding MSA level time trends in column 3 makes little
difference. The last three columns show that there is no change with respect to
non-Hispanic victims.
Since the treatment and control separation around the top and bottom half of the
MSAs is arbitrary, one thing we can do in Appendix Figure A6 is to test whether the
effects are robust to a different choice of treatment MSAs. Each dot corresponds to
a separate difference-in-differences in victimization rates among Hispanics (vertical
caps shows the 95 percent confidence intervals). There is a total of 40 MSAs and we
19 In our theoretical model, crime is assumed to be linked to the likelihood of reporting. In order to
make this relationship explicit, we would have to regress victimization on reporting, instrumenting the
likelihood of reporting to get rid of the endogeneity. In order to do this, we would face three major issues:
i) we would have to define the likelihood of reporting; ii) we would have to assume that the amnesty
only has an impact through reporting; and iii) we would have to deal with the fact that the reporting
regression model and the victimization regression model use different treatment and control groups:
Hispanics vs. non-Hispanics and MSAs with a small vs. large fraction of Hispanic applicants.
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always use the bottom nine as our control MSAs. Moving to the right we add more
and more MSAs to the treatment group. The difference-in-differences is decreasing
as one adds MSAs with a lower fraction of Hispanic applicants, but the effects are
significant all the way to the 29th MSA.
Alternatively, we can change the composition of the control MSAs. This turns out
to generate much larger changes in the effects. Starting with the two MSAs with
the lowest fraction of Hispanics that applied for the IRCA, Cincinnati MSA, and
Norfolk Virginia Beach-Newport News MSA, the effects are close to -20 percent.
Adding more and more MSAs with larger fractions lowers the effects substantially.
The one MSA that really lowers the effects dramatically is NYC (the 11th added
control MSA). Since it is not unimaginable that NYC represents an outlier, in the
right panel we exclude NYC from the sample. When we do this, the effects converge
to about -5 percentage points.
The results are robust to the exclusion of the first two years before the IRCA,
1984 and 1985 (see column 1 of Table 7) and to the exclusion of New York City
(columns 3 and 4) and Los Angeles. The last 4 columns show that the changes in
victimization appear to be concentrated among economic crimes (which is consis-
tent with the results in reporting behavior). These crimes could arguably be the ones
where criminals act in a more rational way.
CONCLUSIONS
We provide evidence that out of fear of deportation, undocumented immigrants are
considerably less likely to report crimes to the police compared to natives (17 percent
vs. almost 40 percent). The 1986 U.S. amnesty that provided legal status to 2.7 mil-
lion immigrants, mainly of Hispanic origin, allows for a difference-in-differences
strategy that deals with the issue that in victimization surveys information about le-
gal status is unavailable. It also deals with the issue that legal status is endogenous.
We develop an empirical model that uses Hispanic origin around amnesties as a
proxy (with known probabilities of mis-classification) for changes in legal status.
The strategy could be used to analyze other outcomes—for example, employment
(Barcellos, 2010).
We show that right after the amnesty, Hispanic immigrants became considerably
more likely to report a crime to the police. Taking into account that not all His-
panic immigrants are undocumented, the changes in reporting rates are close to
20 percentage points.
Undocumented immigrants who are currently living in the U.S. and in otherWest-
ern countries are at least as likely as undocumented immigrants living in the U.S.
around the 1986 IRCA to be deported. This implies that an estimated 11 million un-
documented immigrants are vulnerable when trying to safeguard their fundamental
right to protect their property and their human right to security.
Given that about 15 percent of them are victimized, a 20 percentage point gap
in reporting implies that because of their legal status immigrants have been un-
willing to report 330,000 crimes to the police. Moreover, by increasing the risk of
deportation and its salience, the current U.S. federal policy has probably pushed
undocumented immigrants to further underreport crime incidents. Several newspa-
pers have covered stories of immigrant victims who stay away from the police, even
in Sanctuary Cities (see, among others, Campbell, Mendoza, Diestel, 2018; Queally,
2017; Robbins, 2018).
Themost recent announcements of immigration crackdowns by U.S. immigration
officials may also influence reporting rates, but not necessarily in the expected
direction. In our model, victims report crimes when the benefits are larger than
the cost of reporting and the expected cost of deportation. If the risk of deportation
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increases across the board, even without reporting, undocumented immigrants may
actually become more likely to report a crime, as the relative cost of doing so is
decreasing.
In line with the predictions of this model of crime, there is also some evidence that
undocumented immigrants may be preferred victims of crime, though this evidence
is certainly weaker and requires additional research. In recent years, U.S. lawmakers
have partially addressed the issue. In order to favor the reporting of undocumented
immigrants, in 2008 the U.S. Congress approved a special Visa program (U nonim-
migrant status). According to this program, every year victims of serious offences
who are willing to work with local law enforcement authorities are given temporary
legal status and work eligibility in the United States. The U Visa is unlikely to be
sufficient to protect immigrants’ right to property and security. On one side, only
violent crimes are considered. On the other side, the U Visa is only temporary, last-
ing up to four years, which might not be enough to incentivize immigrants to report
the crime to the police. And, finally, the number of U visas is capped at 10,000.
An open question is whether our results are generalizable to other countries. This
should depend on whether, as in the U.S., immigrants are at risk of deportation
when reporting a crime. It also depends on whether criminals can somehow predict
the legal status of their victims. For example, in many European countries, African
and Asian immigrants have a higher likelihood of being undocumented immigrants.
Our analysis has additional implications that are worth mentioning. It points out
that investigating the consequences of amnesties by looking at reported crimes may
have some important undesirable pitfalls. The increase in reporting might turn out
to be a rise in crime rates even if the true crime rates decreased. These effects
should be carefully taken into account in the empirical investigation of amnesties,
especially when the size of the undocumented immigrant population is large.
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APPENDIX
The Model
We consider a city composed of two ethnic groups—natives and immigrants—
each with mass 1.20 Immigrants are either legal citizens (mass 1 − γ ) or
undocumented (mass 0 < γ < 1). Individuals differ in terms of their wealth:
Table A1. Summary statistics.
Victims All
Sample:
Large fraction of
Hispanic
applicants
Small fraction of
Hispanic
applicants
Large fraction of
Hispanic
applicants
Small fraction of
Hispanic
applicants
MSAs with: Mean
Std.
Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev.
Reported the crime 0.38 0.49 0.39 0.49
Crime victim 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34
Hispanic 0.15 0.35 0.09 0.29 0.17 0.37 0.09 0.29
White 0.85 0.36 0.84 0.36 0.85 0.35 0.85 0.36
Female 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50
Age 25–29 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43
Age 30–34 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43
Age 35–39 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.42
Income $7,500-$14,999 0.17 0.37 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.33
Income $15,000-$24,999 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39
Income $25,000-$29,999 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28
Income $30,000-$49,999 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41
Income $50,000 and over 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.15 0.35 0.13 0.34
Income missing 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35
Observations 37,254 35,994 246,972 271,624
Notes: Based on NCVS datamatched with the 1980 Census. Large and small are defined based on whether
in an MSA more or less than 10 percent of the Hispanic population were amnesty applicants.
20 We use the term “immigrants” loosely to indicate minorities that contain a group of undocumented
individuals. Later on, in our empirical analysis, we focus on Hispanics, an ethnic group that includes
legal citizens and a large fraction of undocumented individuals.
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Figure A1. Optimal Choice of Undocumented Immigrants.
Figure A2. Distribution of Household Income by Hispanic Origin (in percentage).
all immigrants are poor, while natives can be rich (mass 1 − ϕ) or poor
(mass ϕ).21
Each individual chooses whether to be honest or to commit crimes. Criminals
also choose which ethnic group they want to primarily target. Honest individuals
who are victimized decide whether to report the crime to the police. As we show
below, the probability that victims report a crime, ρw,k, depends on their wealth w
 {r,p}, with r > p (rich and poor), and on their legal status k  {l,a}, legal citizen (l),
or undocumented immigrant, for brevity, undocumented (a).
The utility of honest individuals increases with their wealth and their propensity to
report crimes to the police. This latter assumption rests on the observation that the
probability that a victim of a crime receives amonetary compensation—for instance,
21 This assumption is in line with what we observe in our dataset. Income differences between His-
panics and Non-Hispanics are shown to be large in the National Crime and Victimization Survey (see
Appendix Figure A2). Household incomes are only available in broad intervals, but relative income
differences between the two groups are at least equal to 1/4.
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management DOI: 10.1002/pam
Published on behalf of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management
Silence of the Innocents
Figure A3. Time and Duration of Immigration Amnesty Proposals.
Notes: The fraction of IRCA applicants by age and Hispanic origin is based on authors’ calculation
matching the Legalization Summary Public Use Tape with the Census.
Figure A4. Fraction of IRCA Applicants by Hispanic Origin and Age.
Notes: Based on NCVS data matched with IRCA Administrative data and the 1980/1990 Census.
Figure A5. Victimization Rates for Hispanics and Non-Hispanics by MSA type.
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Notes: Each dot corresponds to a separate difference-in-differences in victimization rates among His-
panics. Vertical caps represent the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals. There are a total of
40 MSAs. The control cities are always the bottom 9 based on δ. MSAs are added to the treatment group
starting from top.
Figure A6. Difference-in-Differences in Victimization When Changing the Treated
MSAs.
by means of the (partial) return of the stolen goods or an insurance compensation—
is increasing in the reporting rate: A higher reporting rate increases the capacity to
protect one’s property rights. Crime, instead, reduces the utility. Summing up, the
utility of an honest individual with wealth w  {r,p} and legal status k  {l,a} is:
uhonw,k = f (w, ρw,k) − βX,
where f(·) is an increasing function of the wealth and of the reporting rate of the indi-
vidual. In turn, βXmeasures the disutility from crime, with β > 0 and X representing
the overall number of criminals in the city.22
Individuals choose whether to be honest or criminals, and, in the latter case,
which ethnic group to primarily target. Individuals differ in terms of their (potential)
criminal ability. We let θ  [0,1] be a random variable measuring the individual’s
criminal ability, assumed to be uniformly distributed in the population. Criminals
observe the ethnicity of potential victims, but not their wealth or their legal status.
22 Notice that the disutility from crime depends on the overall level of criminality and not just on
the number of criminals targeting the ethnic group to which the individual belongs. This assumption
greatly simplifies the computation of the equilibrium and it is in line with the fact that, despite targeting
primarily one group, a criminal may end up committing offences to individuals belonging to the other
group. Moreover, the disutility from crime incorporates all the direct and indirect welfare loss, as,
for instance, the drop in real estate value (see Gibbons, 2004; Linden & Rocko, 2008; Thaler, 1978),
population, as well as economic activity (see Cullen & Levitt, 1999), when crime levels are high.
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Notes: Each dot corresponds to a separate difference-in-differences in victimization rates among His-
panics. Vertical caps represent the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals. There are a total of 40
MSAs. The treated cities are always the top 18 based on δ. MSAs are added to the control group starting
from the bottom based on δ. The right panel excludes the 11th control MSA, NYC, a clear outlier.
Figure A7. Difference-in-Differences in Victimization Rates When Changing the
Control MSAs.
By targeting immigrants, criminals know that, compared to natives, the average
wealth is lower, and, with probability γ , the victim is undocumented.23
Criminals choosewhich ethnic group to primarily target.When a criminal chooses
to target primarily group j, then with probability ξ the crime is actually committed
against an individual in group j, where 1/2  ξ  1. With probability 1−ξ , instead,
the victim belongs to the other group; these mistakes—the criminal targets one
group but ends up committing a crime against individuals belonging to the other
group—may depend on the victim’s physical appearance, as well as on the level of
segregation of ethnic groups. Taking the case of the U.S., not all Hispanic-looking
individuals are necessarily of Hispanic origin, and vice versa, although living in a
severely segregated Hispanic neighborhood may lower 1–ξ .
The expected utility of an individual with criminal ability θ who commits crimes
targeting individuals belonging to the ethnic group j  {n,i} is:
ucr, j (θ) = θE(w| j) − C(ρ| j).
E(w|j) is the expected wealth of the victim, conditional on the criminal targeting
ethnic group j. The expectation operator accounts both for the fact that victims in
the target group may have different levels of wealth (this is the case of natives) and
for the fact that the victim belongs to the targeted group with probability ξ  1. The
term C(ρ|j) is the expected cost of punishment, conditional on the criminal targeting
individuals of group j. C(ρ|j) is an increasing function of the average reporting rate
of the ethnic groups weighted by ξ . Again, the expectation accounts for the fact that
individuals in the target group may have different reporting rates and also for the
fact that the crime can end up being committed against an individual who does not
belong to the target ethnicity.
23 The U.S. is a clear example of where ethnicity, particularly being of Hispanic origin, carries some
signal for the migration status.
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The Reporting Decision
We assume that the monetary loss that a victim suffers is proportional to his level of
wealth w, but in a stochastic way. The loss is αw  [0,w], where α is the realization
of a random variable distributed according to F(α), with support [0,1].
Victims report the crime to the police when the monetary loss is larger than the
cost of reporting; formally, this occurs when:
αw ≥ T + gkD,or α ≥ T + gkD
w
≡ α¯w,k,
where T is a fixed cost of reporting crime, gk is the risk of deportation for an indi-
vidual with status k, which is zero for legal citizens and positive for undocumented
immigrants (evidence is provided in the empirical section), and D is the associated
cost. Notice that the threshold α¯w,k decreases with wealth (w), and increases with the
risk of deportation (gk) and with the cost of deportation (D); hence, α¯p,a > α¯p,l > α¯r,l .
The probability that victims report a crime is simply ρw,k ≡ 1 − F(α¯w,k), with
ρr,l > ρp,l > ρp,a: the propensity to report crime to the police is largest for rich na-
tives, lowest for undocumented immigrants, and intermediate for legal immigrants
and poor natives. These inequalities imply that the average reporting rate is larger
for natives compared to immigrants.
Equilibrium
Individuals observe their criminal ability θ and decide whether to be honest or to
become criminals. Criminals also choose their target group, natives or immigrants.
Let us start with this latter decision. Criminals prefer to target primarily natives
whenever:
θ ≥ C(ρ|n) − C(ρ|i)
E(w|n) − E(w|i) ≡ θ¯ .
The relevant trade-off when deciding the target ethnic group is between a larger gain
when targeting natives (among the natives there are also some rich individuals) with
a smaller expected punishment when targeting immigrants (the average reporting
rate is lower among immigrants). It follows that criminals with higher abilities
(θ ≥ θ¯) prefer to target natives rather than immigrants.
Consider now the decision of whether to be honest or become a criminal.We focus
on the most interesting case in which the marginal criminal is indifferent between
being honest and committing crimes targeting primarily immigrants.24 Moreover,
we assume that r (the wealth of the rich) is large enough so that all rich natives prefer
to be honest. Poor natives and legal immigrants have the same wealth and reporting
rate; therefore, they behave in the same way. They prefer to commit crimes targeting
immigrants rather than being honest when:
θ ≥ f
(
p, ρp,l
) − βX + C(ρ|i)
E(w|i) ≡ θˆp (X) .
24 This is an interesting case since each group of natives and immigrants is targeted by some criminals. By
contrast, if the marginal criminal is indifferent between being honest and committing crimes targeting
natives, then all criminals prefer to target the native group and no criminal targets the immigrant
community. Formally, in the analysis, we focus on the case in which θ ˆa(X) < θ¯.
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The above condition says that these individuals prefer to be criminals rather than
honest when their criminal ability is sufficiently large: θ ≥ θˆp(X). Notice that the
threshold θˆp(X) depends on the level of criminality X.
Similarly, for undocumented immigrants, committing crimes that target group i
is preferred to being honest when:
θ ≥ f
(
p, ρp,a
) − βX + C (ρ|i)
E (w|i) ≡ θˆa (X) .
Looking more closely to the thresholds θˆp(X) and θˆa(X), it follows that undoc-
umented immigrants have a higher propensity to become criminals than poor
natives/legal immigrants: θˆa(X) < θˆp(X). This is due to their lower reporting
rate (ρp,a < ρp,l), which implies a reduced ability to protect their property rights:
f (wp, ρp,a) < f (wp, ρp,l).
In order to define the equilibrium, we need to determine the endogenous level
of criminality, X. Since, θ  U(0,1), it follows that among the γ undocumented
immigrants γ (1 − θˆa(X)) are criminals. The number of criminals in the pool of
poor natives and legal immigrants, instead, amounts to (1 − γ + ϕ)(1 − θˆp(X)).
Therefore, X = γ (1− θˆa(X))+(1−γ +ϕ)(1− θˆp(X)) and the equilibrium is determined
by the triple { θ¯ , θˆp,θ ˆa} satisfying:25
i) C(ρ|n)−C(ρ|i)E(w|n)−E(w|i)
ii) θˆp and θˆa that solve the system
θˆp =
f
(
p, ρp,l
) − β [γ (1 − θˆa
) + (1 − γ + ϕ) (1 − θˆp
)] + C(ρ|i)
E(w|i)
θˆa
f
(
p, ρp,a
) − β [γ (1 − θˆa
) + (1 − γ + ϕ) (1 − θˆp
)] + C(ρ |i )
E(w |i ) .
Figure A1 provides a graphical representation of the optimal choices of undocu-
mented immigrants depending on θ : Individuals with low criminal ability (θ < θˆa)
are honest, those with intermediate ability (θˆa ≤ θ < θ¯) become criminals and target
immigrants, while individuals with high criminal skills (θ  θ¯) become criminals
and target natives. For poor natives/legal immigrants, the optimal choices and their
graphical representation are similar, with threshold θˆp in place of θˆa.
The Effect of an Amnesty
Consider now the effects of an amnesty that legalizes a fraction δ  (0,γ ] of undocu-
mented immigrants. The amnesty eliminates the risk of deportation, thus increasing
the reporting rate of legalized immigrants from ρp,a to ρp,l. This fact has two direct
consequences. First, legalized immigrants are better able to protect their property
rights, and therefore their utility when honesty increases. Second, the average re-
porting rate of immigrants increases, and such an increase is stronger the larger δ,
i.e., the larger the number of legalized immigrants. The effects that these changes
have on crime are described in the following proposition.
25 We implicitly assume 0 < θ ˆa < θ
ˆ
p < θ < 1.
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Proposition A1
An amnesty reduces the overall number of crimes. It also reduces the number of
crimes committed against immigrants while, depending on the parameter ξ , it can
either increase or decrease those committed against natives. The reduction in the
overall number of crimes and in the number of crimes committed against immi-
grants is larger the greater the mass of legalized immigrants (the larger δ).
Proof of Proposition A1
Let ρ¯i(δ) and ρ¯n(δ) be the average reporting rate of immigrants and natives, respec-
tively. Fromour assumptions about themasses of the different groups of individuals,
it follows that:
ρ¯i(δ) = (1 − γ + δ)ρp,l + (γ − δ)ρp,a,
ρ¯n = ϕρp,l + (1 − ϕ)ρr,l
Notice that the average reporting rate of immigrants depends on δ, the mass of
legalized individuals. Specifically, since ρp,l > ρp,a, ρ¯i(δ) increases with δ and takes
the lowest value when δ = 0, i.e., before the amnesty.
The expected cost of punishmentwhen targeting primarily immigrants and natives
is:
C(ρ|i, δ) = C (ξ ρ¯i (δ) + (1 − ξ) ρ¯n) ,
C (ρ|n, δ) = C (ξ ρ¯n + (1 − ξ) ρ¯i (δ)) ,
respectively. Notice that since we assume that C(·) is increasing in the average
reporting rate, then it follows that both C(ρ|i) and C(ρ|n) are increasing in δ.
The expected wealth of the victim when targeting primarily immigrants and na-
tives is:
E [w|i] = ξp+ (1 − ξ) (ϕp+ (1 − ϕ) r) ,
E [w|n] = ξ (ϕp+ (1 − ϕ) r) + (1 − ξ) p,
respectively; notice that these expressions do not depend on δ.
Before demonstrating the statement of Proposition A1, we determine the equilib-
rium of the model. Following the discussion in the text, the equilibrium is defined
by the triple:26
i) θ¯(δ) = C(ρ|n,δ)−C(ρ|i,δ)E(w|n)−E(w|i)
ii) θˆp(δ) and θˆa(δ) that solve the system:
θˆP(δ) = f (p, ρp,l) − β[(γ − δ)(1 − θˆa(δ)) + (1 − γ + δ + ϕ)(1 − θˆp(δ))] + C(ρ|i, δ)E(w|i) ,
θˆa(δ) = f (p, ρp,a) − β[(γ − δ)(1 − θˆa(δ)) + (1 − γ + ϕ)(1 − θˆp(δ))] + C(ρ|i, δ)E(w|i) .
26 We implicitly assume 0 < θ ˆa < θ
ˆ
p < 1.
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Simple algebra leads to the following expressions:
θˆp(δ) = E(w|i)(β(1 + ϕ) − f (p, ρp,l) − C(ρ|i, δ)) + β(γ − δ)( f (p, ρp,l) − f (p, ρp,a))E(w|i)(β(1 + ϕ) − E(w|i)) ,
θˆa(δ) = E(w|i)(β(1+ϕ)− f (p,ρp,a))−C(ρ|i,δ))−β(1− γ + δ +ϕ)( f (p,ρp,l)− f (p,ρp,a))E(w|i)(β(1+ϕ)− E(w|i)) .
We first characterize the effect of the amnesty on the thresholds θˆp(δ), θ ˆa(δ), and
θ¯(δ). This is shown in Claim A1 below. For the sake of simplicity, we let θˆp(δ =
0), θˆa(δ = 0), and θ¯(δ = 0) denote the thresholds before the amnesty is in place (when
δ = 0). Similarly, we let C0(ρ|i) and C0(ρ|n) be the expected costs of punishment
before the amnesty. Finally, notice that neither E[w|i] nor E[w|n] change because of
amnesty.
Claim A1
An amnesty that legalized δ  (0,γ ] undocumented immigrants increases θˆp(δ) and
θˆa(δ)) while reducing θ¯(δ). These changes are larger the greater δ.
Proof of Claim A1
Consider the effect of the amnesty on θˆp(δ). The change in the threshold equals
θˆp(δ = 0) − θˆp(δ > 0)
= E(w|i)[C(ρ|i, δ〉0) − C(ρ|i, δ = 0)] + βδ( f (p, ρp,l) − f (p, ρp,a))
E(w|i)(β(1 + ϕ) − E(w|i)) . (A.1)
This expression is positive since C(ρ | i, δ > 0) > C(ρ | i, δ = 0), f (p, ρp,l) >
f (p, ρp,a), and the denominator is positive since 0 < θ ˆp(δ) < 1. These conditions
and the fact that C(ρ|i,δ) increases with δ ensures that the above expression is larger
the greater δ. Similar arguments apply for the other two thresholds, θˆa(δ)and θ¯(δ).
Claim A1 and condition θˆa(δ) < θˆp(δ) ensure that the level of criminality—i.e.,
(γ − δ)(1 − θˆa(δ)) + (1 − γ + ϕ)(1 − θˆp(δ))—reduces after the amnesty and that the
reduction is stronger the larger δ.
Consider now the number of criminals targeting the two ethnic groups and the
number of crimes committed against immigrants and natives. Criminals who are
primarily targeting immigrants and natives are
I (δ) = (γ − δ) ( −θˆa (δ)) + (1 − γ + δ + ϕ)) − θ θˆp (δ)),
N (δ) = (γ − δ) (1−)) + (1 − γ + δ + ϕ) (1−)) = (1 + ϕ) (1−)),
respectively. Since criminals targeting group j  {n,i} commit crimes against mem-
bers of the other group with probability (1−ξ), the number of criminals actually
committing crimes against immigrants is Xi(δ) = ξI(δ) + (1 − ξ)N(δ) while that of
criminals actually committing crimes against natives is Xn = ξN(δ) + (1 − ξ)I(δ).
Simple algebra leads to the following expressions:
Xi(δ) = (1 + ϕ)θ¯(δ)(2ξ − 1) + (1 − ξ)(1 + ϕ) − ξ((γ − δ)θˆa(δ) + (1 − γ + δ + ϕ)θˆp(δ)),
Xn(δ) = (1 + ϕ)θ¯(δ)(1 − 2ξ) + ξ(1 + ϕ) − (1 − ξ)((γ − δ)θˆa(δ) + (1 − γ + δ + φ)θˆp(δ)).
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Notice that Xi(δ) decreases with δ since ξ  1/2, θ¯(δ)decreases with δ, θˆa(δ) and
θˆp(δ) increase with δ, and θˆa(δ) < θˆp(δ). Moreover, the higher δ, the stronger the
reduction in Xi(δ). Therefore, the number of crimes committed against immigrants
lessens after the amnesty and the reduction is stronger the larger the number of
legalized individuals (the larger δ). Consider now the crimes that are committed
against natives. For ξ = 1, Xn(δ) becomes − (1 + ϕ)θ¯ + (1 + ϕ), which increases with
δ (since θ¯(δ) decreases with δ). By contrast, for ξ = 1/2, Xn(δ) becomes
1
2
(1 + ϕ) − 1
2
((γ − δ)θˆa(δ) + (1 − γ + δ + ϕ)θˆp(δ)),
which reduces with δ since: θˆa(δ) and θˆp(δ) increase with δ, and θˆp(δ) < θˆp(δ).
Therefore, after the amnesty, the number of crimes committed against natives can
increase (when ξ is close to 1) or decrease (when ξ is close to 1/2).
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